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HARNO t

Criminal justice in the United States functions through a variety of

oddly-assorted agencies.

In the main these agencies are uncoordinated and

are not conceived to carry the burden of modern criminal traffic. The fact
is that the whole fabric of the criminal law and its administration stands in
urgent need of reconstruction; but this presents an exceedingly complex
task. One difficulty is that the social engineer who approaches this undertaking is apt to believe that the defects of a part are the faults of the whole
and to proceed to insert props here and there instead of rebuilding from
the foundation. The problems of reconstruction are many and of different
types. To enumerate but a few, there are jurisdictional difficulties centering
in the county, the local administrative unit for crime control. Here operate
the prosecuting attorney, the sheriff, and the coroner, whose duties and
powers stand in need of revision. The jurisdiction of the police, the'arelation to state and county officials, and police personnel present another
phase of the difficulty. Political dominance of and interference with the
agents for crime control further complicate the situation. There are problems of procedure and of coordination and control of the agents for law
administration, and problems relating to the treatment of offenders and to
probation and parole. The social engineer who grapples with this task
must appraise all these difficulties, but, if he is to rebuild from the foundation, he must delve yet more deeply and reexamine the basic philosophy
of the criminal law; he must study the concept of criminal responsibility
on which the criminal law is founded, and which in one of its phases has
given rise to a penal system which is "as irrational in its mercies as in its
rigors, and in its rigors as in its mercies."'
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No one can review the histories of our prison population, which record
how prisoner after prisoner has started a criminal career with juvenile
delinquencies and petty offenses and has moved on through more serious
crimes for which he has incurred sentences to reform schools and a series
of sentences to penitentiaries, without being struck with the social waste,
the futility, and the hopelessness of our processes.2 We would like to
assume that these processes are aimed to protect society from anti-social
elements and to secure for it a more wholesome environment. The discriminating observer cannot escape the truth, however, that these procedures do
not function in that way; rather do they increase the hazards of society
through making those of its members who have demonstrated anti-social
tendencies incurably and viciously anti-social. The modem state, it seems,
prefers to eliminate its weeds through an elaborate and costly scheme of
watering and fertilization.
NEED FOR REEXAMINATION

OF BASIC THEORY

Criminal law administration has been under severe criticism for some
time. This criticism has been centered on the laxity of law enforcement.
There is no doubt that the administration of the criminal law is ineffective,
but it has occurred to only a few of the many who have made indictments
that this laxity, this ineffectiveness of administration, might be a symptom
rather than a prime condition-a symptom of some deeper-lying causes. 3
Sheldon Glueck, writing in 1928, observed that "in all of the survey
reports thus far published, and in the work of commissions and conferences,
no serious attempt seems to have been made at a basic analysis of the presuppositions and prejudices crystallized in the substantive and procedural
criminal law." 4 Since that time a number of important studies have been
made; yet Glueck's statement remains essentially true.
There are indications that we are at the beginning of a number of
undertakings in various states to codify, or, as the situation may be, to
recodify the criminal law. Is this work to proceed, as it has so often in
the past, without an analysis of the assumptions underlying the criminal
law? Historically that law is based upon the doctrine of the free determination of the will, on the "theory of punishing the vicious will". 5 This,
as Pound has pointed out,
"postulates a free moral agent, confronted with a choice between doing
right and doing wrong, and choosing freely to do wrong. It assumes
that the social interest in the general security and the social interest in
2. Id. at 91.
3. See GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE (1936), particularly chapter I, "The Climate of
Justice"; McDougall, Crime in America (1927) 77 FORUM 518.
4. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 453.
5. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930) 33.
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the general morals are to be maintained by imposing on him a penalty
corresponding exactly to the gravity of his offense." 6
Are we to go on assuming the validity of these postulates in the light of
modern thought and in view of the studies made of this problem by psychologists, psychiatrists and criminologists?
In preparing itself for the task of drafting a criminal code, any group
charged with the undertaking should begin with a thoroughgoing research
into the basic aims of the criminal law. As a guiding principle it should
steadfastly hold to the view that it must make this fundamental reexamination and establish a unity of aim for the prospective code before it turns
to drafting. The need for this approach was recognized and emphasized
in an excellent report to the Council of the American Law Institute by a
committee appointed to advise the Council on a criminal justice project.
This report states:
"Not only are the substantive, procedural and administrative parts
of the law so dependent for effectiveness one upon the other that their
provisions must be coordinated into a harmonious whole, but . . . all

the content of the law must be formulated in contemplation of existing
social and economic conditions with an appreciation of human characteristics. If the substantive law is built upon certain assumptions of
social and economic conditions and human characteristics, the procedural law and approved administrative practices must be based upon
consistent assumptions." 7
The study of aims must go deeply into the recesses of human behavior
and motivation. It must take into consideration social attitudes that prompt
an insistent demand for severe punishment. The builders of a systematio
code should weigh the dangers of fashioning one which is too far in advance
of the mores of the time." It would be unsafe as well as unscientific for
them to assume that the retributive theory of punishment is a dead issue.
Let anyone who doubts this statement open his eyes to what is going on
about him. Let him consider the motivation of the parent who chastises
his child, the attitude of the two-fisted fellow who replies to an insult with
blows, the psychology behind feuds, and the phenomenon of the Hauptmann
case. "The thirst for vengeance," admonishes Mr. justice Cardozo, "is
a very real, even if it be a hideous, thing; and states may not ignore it till
humanity has been raised to greater heights than any that have yet been
6. Id. at 33-34. See Social Service Faculty of the Catholic University of Milan, On the
Reform of the Italian Penal Code (1924) 14 J. CGm. L. 524-525.
7. 12 PRoc. Amr. LAW INST. (1935) 385, 386. And see Gausewitz, ConsiderationsBasic
to a New Penal Code (1936) II Wis. L. Rxv. 346, 35o.
8. See SALEiLLEs, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (IgII) x87-i88; Hall, Criminology and a Modern Penal Code (1936) 27 J. CRim. L. i, ii.
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scaled in all the long ages of struggle and ascent." 0 There can be no doubt
that it would be preferable to give no consideration to the retributive theory
in a schematic treatment of the subject of crime, for it is destructive of the
ends which should be sought through a scientific modern code. Yet the
desire for vengeance is so deeply rooted in human psychology that it would
be a serious mistake for the drafters of a code not to grapple with it.
As the group proceeds with its preliminary researches it will need to
weigh the deterrent theory of punishment; it will need to conduct careful
studies into the social effects of punishment. Is there adequate evidence that
punishment prevents the offender from the commission of future crimes?
Arguments for punishment for the sake of deterrence have been advanced
for centuries, but no carefully weighed judgment on the effects of punishment, founded on supporting data, has ever been made. Statements on the
subject by judges and legal writers have, for the most part, been mere individual opinions based on casual observations. The question calls for controlled studies under the supervision of skilled individuals. The persistence
through the years of the belief that punishment is a deterrent is not to be
ignored, and we know from the studies of the psychologists that fear is a
powerful motivating force. Punishment may deter some from committing
a second crime, and so the social effects may be good as to those who are
held in check. And through the example made of those who are punished
the criminal tendencies of others who have not yet trodden the path of
criminal deeds may be deterred, and thus the claim for severe punishment
might be substantiated. 10 The deterrent theory must be given weight in
the drafting of a code, but the question for determination is, how much
emphasis should be given to it? If punishment is an important factor in
curbing crime, it might be wise to insert provisions in a code for conspicuous
and cruel punishment. The whole tenor of a code might even be shaped
about that principle. However, in the light of long experience with penalties of varying degrees of severity, we can be fairly certain that the doctrine
of deterrence cannot be made the central theme of a modem code. While
it probably is true that "there are inhibitions in the threat of punishment
9. CADozo, op. cit. mpra note I, at 87-88. Cf. Glueck, supra note 4, at 456: "No thoughtful person today seriously holds this theory of sublimated social vengeance, nor that 'expiative
theory' which is the reverse of the shield of retribution."
io. An interesting but less commonly advanced point of view is stressed in the following
statement: "When, therefore, a criminal act is punished too severely or when the criminal
escapes punishment altogether, the average person is apt to feel that his own personal freedom
is in danger. It is as though he could say to himself, 'If another person has escaped the punishment that he deserves, why should I seek to conform to standards which are against my
own instinctual impulses?' In other words, a failure to punish a criminal is a kind of threat
to the repressions which each person places upon his own id. When a criminal whom everyone believes to be guilty is dismissed by the creation of a reasonable doubt in the minds of a
jury, a court is put in the position of saying that the defendant must be allowed to conduct
himself in a way that is denied other persons." GaIFFiTH, AN INTRODUCrION TO APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY (1934) 265.
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that society cannot afford to withdraw from any capable of feeling them", 1
the fact remains that punishment as a means of control has been tried in
a major role for centuries and has proved patently inadequate. Punishment
for the sake of deterrence has been one of the theories, if not the major
one, underlying the philosophy of criminal law administration during modem civilization; yet under its sway we have merely achieved a crime situation from which we ardently seek relief.
In the evolution of the criminal law from its primitive beginnings
centered in vengeance to the present time, there has gradually taken place
a shift in emphasis in the concept of punishment which may easily escape
attention but which is responsible for no little confusion. The vengeance
motive involved punishment in kind-an eye for an eye. It was retaliative,
and in its origin it was a personal affair. The injured person did not hate
crime, nor did he or his kinsmen conceive of punishment as a measure
involving group security. The mores of the time demanded that he avenge
the wrong. The retaliatory act had no utilitarian or ethical significance.
Later, when punishment was taken over by the priests, the procedure became
an expiatory rite '-2 -the wrongdoer atoned through suffering. This ceremony still involved no thought of punishment of anti-social conduct nor
of assuring group protection or security. There was no indignation against
the offender. But with the advancement of the deterrent theory a distinct change in emphasis occurred. This theory involved a rationalization
on punishment. It should be observed, however, that they who advanced
the theory did not ask, should we punish? They assumed that they should
as part of the established order; their task was to find a reason for punishment. Punishment for them was, as it is with us, an institution. They
found that the vengeance and expiatory theories would not rationalize, for
they spelled futility. But punishment as a deterrent was quite another
matter. With the advancement of this theory recognition could be given
to punishment both as an institution and as a utilitarian procedure. We
have emphasized the need for research into the basic aims of the criminal
law and have urged careful analysis of all presuppositions. Consistent with
this procedure the investigator should probe to its foundation the question
whether punishment as an institution, encumbered as it is with historical
implications and entanglements, should be retained in a modem code.
The shift in thought on the concept of punishment is all the more
marked in the light of present-day thinking. From punishment as an institution of vengeance and expiation, without social utility, to punishment
as a deterrent, still an institution but with rationalization of its social signifiii. CARnozo, op. cit. supra note I, at 88.
z2. See ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL,

67-68.

THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC (1931)
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cance, modern thought is turning its emphasis to measures of social utility.
The tendency is to ignore the institution of punishment and to inquire into
its effectiveness as an instrument for crime repression and control. Under
this view punishment tends no longer to be an end in itself; it tends to lose
its institutional traits and to become a mere procedure subordinate to social
ends, to be weighed along with other procedures on the scale of their effectiveness in protecting society.
PROTECTION OF SOCIETY

This brings us to another cardinal principle which should be followed
in the drafting of a modem code. The basic aim of the code should be the
protection of society, 13 and it should guarantee individual rights so far as
feasibly consonant with that principle. As the German psychiatrist, Aschaffenburg, has said:
"I agree with Ferri: 'The natural foundation and the fundamental
principle of the repression of crimes exists solely in the necessity for
self-preservation, which applies to every individual and every social
organism.' From this standpoint, which sees in crime only the injury
to society, and in punishment only the necessary social reaction against
it, the struggle against criminals must be carried on." 14
To which Ferri has added:
"The reforms proposed by us should guarantee individual rights at
the same time as social rights." 15

If we take the protection of society as a basic aim, we are in a position
to begin the unravelling of the tangle. Punishment could then be considered
as a protective measure and evaluated as a means to that end. It is from
that point of view that we should construct a new philosophy of the criminal
law. Factors which heretofore have been obscure should be judged in the
light of this aim. If the object is to protect society, the emphasis shifts
from the particular offense to the personality of the offender. The whole
system of the penal law as it now stands stresses the offense. But if protection is the aim, the principal inquiry should be as to the dangerousness of
the offender. It is he whom society has to fear. To find how much it has
to fear him it must diagnose him to determine his motivations, his anti-social
tendencies, his personality, and his responsiveness to peno-correctional treatment. Liszt pointed out years ago that the doer, not the deed, should be
punished. But our system is not adapted to these ends. What we have is
a formal program of regulations prohibiting various types of conduct and
13. 12 PROc. Am. LAW INST. (1935) 384.
14. ASCHAFFENBURG, CRIME AND ITS REPRssION (913) 247.
15. Ferri, Reforn of the Italian Penal Code (192o) 36 L. Q. REV. 292, 3oo. Ferri also
takes into consideration the person injured, which feature presents an interesting point for
study. See Kidd, Projectfor an Italian Penal Code (1922) io CALIF. L. REv. 384, 390-391.
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declaring what the state proposes to do to those who violate these regulations.
The penalties are measured according to the legislator's judgment of the
gravity of the offense. There is no effort to determine the dangerousness
of the offender other than through the possible implications arising from the
fact that he has violated a regulation. At best, this is a hit-or-miss procedure and only indirectly and casually is the public protected by it.
INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT

Closely associated with the position that the basic aim of the criminal
law is the protection of society is the doctrine of individualization of punishment. This doctrine involves dealing with the offender according to the
risks he creates for society; it requires that the nature of the punishment
be determined by the nature of the individual. Under it the criminal is dealt
with on the basis of his present and potential dangerousness to society, and
only when he is judged a safe risk is he released. 1 6 A person suffering
from a contagious disease is segregated during the term of his affliction. An
insane man is committed for the period of his insanity. To permit either
of these persons to go about in the community would expose its members to
well-recognized risks. Can it be conceived that they are any more dangerous to the community than, a vicious criminal at large? The situation has
been aptly stated by the Italian criminologist, Ferri, in the following parallel:
"This is one of the conclusions upon which the school of criminal
anthropology has most strongly insisted, namely, that it is as absurd to
predetermine the date at which a convicted person shall be released
from prison as for a doctor to stand at a hospital door and say to each
patient: 'Stay two weeks in the hospital.' 'But what if I am cured
before that?' 'Stay two weeks anyhow.' 'But if I'm not cured in a
fortnight?'

'You go out just the same! '" 17
MOTIVE

But how is individualization of punishment to be achieved? Stated
more broadly, if protection of society is to be the basic aim of the criminal
law, and if this protection can best be secured through a process of determining the dangerousness of the individual offender, how are we to determine
when a particular individual is dangerous and when not? This, to be sure, cannot be accomplished through any of the usual processes now employed in the
law. 18 The fact that an individual has transgressed one of society's formal
16. See Gausewitz, supra note 7, at 359.
17. Quoted critically in Social Service Faculty of the Catholic University of Milan,
supranote 6, at 527. See also ASCHAFFENBURG,

I8.
(1936).
that we
believes

Op. cd.

supra note 14, at 249.

But compare GELELKF, CRIMINAl. AcTIONs IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURTS OF OHIO
At the conclusion of this valuable statistical study, Mr. Gehike expresses the view
have practically abandoned the classical principle of criminal responsibility. This he
has been accomplished through provisions for indeterminate sentences and "the prac-
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regulations may be some indication that he is dangerous, but this conduct,
particularly if it was a single act, affords an imperfect criterion of his
character. To understand his character and to determine his anti-social
traits we must know a good deal about human behavior and about the sociopsychological factors which have influenced the individual under examination.
We must, indeed, give weight to a factor in the study of behavior
which the law has long neglected, and not only neglected but consistently
and expressly shunted aside. In order to interpret particular individual
conduct we must have knowledge of the motives underlying the given act.1 9
It is a curious comment on legal learning that judges and lawmakers have
so long resisted consideration of what is essentially the determining factor
in human behavior-that they have taken the position that motive is of no
consequence in the criminal law. Actually this element has slipped in, often
vicariously when it was called something else, and at times sub rosa when it
was said that something made the jury go awry; but never has it received
the august approval of the law. And yet what is it that determines human
conduct? What is it that determines character? Why do some men kill,
steal, rape and commit perjury? Why do others refrain from such conduct?
When we have the answer to these questions we are on our way to understanding character and to understanding why society needs protection from
some individuals and not from others. From the point of view of the
danger they hold for society, it is far more important to determine why men
have committed offenses than to determine that they did commit them.
Modem thought and research in psychology and psychiatry have made
such progress in diagnosing behavior that there is little question but that
these disciplines can make valuable contributions to the criminal law. They
maintain that behavior is determined by social, biological, and psychological
causative factors, and that it represents a complicated balance between gratifications and renunciations. Thus a man is constantly subjected to conflicttice of granting probation, suspending sentence without probation, imposing nominal sentences,

finding the defendant guilty of lesser offenses, modifying sentences once imposed, etc. To
this is added the whole procedure of the accepting of pleas by the prosecutor, in which there
is no theoretical limit to the variety of sentences that may be imposed as a result of the plea."
Id. at 292. The demand for individualization of treatment, he believes, could scarcely be
more completely satisfied, if it were not for one fact. That fact is "that the basis of individualization is the character and behavior trends of the defendant, not as scientifically determined,
but as determined by the formal decision of legal guilt together with whatever observation the
judge or the prosecutor can make. And in the case of the prosecutor, the judgment is further

affected by his need for making a 'good record' for percentage of successful cases. We have
individualization of treatment by the courts, plenty of it, but the basis is faulty, whether from
the strictly retributive point of view or from the point of view of determining the course of
treatment which will be most likely either to reform the criminal or to segregate him if incurable."

Id. at 293.

ig. See
Xiv-Xv.

ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC (1931)
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ing motives. 20 It is through study of these motives that insight can be
gained into his character, but character is not revealed alone through the
immediate motive which prompted the criminal act. Many men have motives for criminal conduct but do not yield to them. The factors which
caused a person to yield are important. Any person who contemplates the
commission of a crime, particularly if it is his first, is likely to be beset
with a number of conflicting antecedent motives. These motives are determined by his background-his environment, heredity and training. His
conduct depends upon the relative strength or weakness of his motives, and
his dominant motives determine his character. The answer to the question
whether a particular individual is dangerous to society lies in an analysis
of the strength of his motives for good or evil; it lies in a study of his
whole personality. In view of the scientific studies on motivation in relation
to crime which have been and are being conducted, and in the light of
modem thought, it would seem clear that this factor must be given consideration in any thoroughgoing work on a criminal code. We add, therefore, as another principle which should guide those who are to labor on the
drafting of it, that they make a searching examination into the motive factor
both in its relation to the substantive criminal law and to the administration
of that law, and that they give particular attention in this study to the
quesion whether an acceptance of the scientific implications involved in the
doctrine of motivation can be rationalized with the prevailing views on
criminal intent and with the doctrine of criminal responsibility.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

The criminal law is erected on the premise of responsibility. For criminal responsibility there must be a criminal act and, in the usual case, an
intention to commit the act. This responsibility is based on a preconceived
conception of freedom of the will. Under this theory, when an offendei;
is being tried the issue centers on whether he intentionally committed the
act and, if the further issue is raised, on matters of extenuation or defense.
If it can be established pathologically or psychologically that the offender
did not have freedom of the will at the time the act was committed, he
escapes punishment. Such is the doctrine. No question is raised of hig
20. See ALEXANDER AND HEALY, ROOTS OF CRIME (1935) ; ASCHAFFENBURG, op. Cit. supra
note 14, at 243-245; FERal, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY (1917) 423-432; GLUECK, PROBATION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1933) 197; SALEILLES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 239-253; Ploscowe,

European Criminal Codes (1930) 21 J. CRIm. L. 26.
Article 62 of the Penal Code of Italy provides that "having acted for motives of special
moral or social value" shall "extenuate the offense". Article 48 of the Penal Code of the
R. S. F. S. R. (Russia) has a similar provision. Article 47 of the Russian Code has this provision: "The fundamental question to be decided in each particular case is that of the social
danger of the crime before the court." See ZELITCH, SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF THE C1IMINAL LAW (I931) 172. For a statement on the progressive measures of the Mexican Code,
see Mendoza, The Mexican System of Criminology (I93O) 21 J. CRIM. L. I5.
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dangerous quality, and there is no weighing of the interests of society.
The issue focuses on the offender's moral responsibility which, in its ultimate terms, involves a metaphysical question.
Now if we were to accept the protection of society as a basic aim of the
criminal law and were to deal with the offender according to the measure
of his danger to society, the whole problem would become rational and
there would no longer be any complicated question of moral responsibility.
We would then be dealing with the criminal as we do with any other person
whose presence involves a menace to the community. We do not stop to
inquire whether a man with a contagious disease is morally responsible
for his condition. When this condition is established we deprive him of
his liberty forthwith and segregate him with the greatest expedition possible. It is submitted that the traditional approach through the doctrine
of responsibility and freedom of the will has sent us off on the wrong track
and set us to discussing metaphysical problems while the enemy is at our
door. Let us turn to reality. The criminal is an enemy of society-a social
menace-and should be dealt with accordingly.
In the meantime our scientific co-workers are piling up evidence which
has reached formidable proportions to ,the effect that the very presuppositions on which the legal doctrine rests, namely, responsibility and freedom
of the will, are myths. If we accept this thesis, a will that acts without
motives does not exist. While the outposts of learning have not been far
advanced in this field, the view stressed in this study would avoid the implications of a fatalistic doctrine under which events move according to a
predetermined and immutable schedule. The position is that a given act is
determined by antecedent motives; that, in fact, every act is the result of
the effect of a series of motives on a certain character. 21 To that extent,
and for any given act, conduct is determined. But this does not mean that
the emotional tendencies are not amenable to therapy and guidance. The
view is that the individual is subject to treatment, and that with proper
treatment it is possible to shift the balance of conflicting forces within him
from anti-social to social tendencies. This, it is submitted, is the direction
in which the best thought in this field is moving.
But we must not go too far in appearing to advocate a particular program. It is not the purpose of this study to establish that the psychiatrists,
psychologists, or, as the case may be, the social workers, are right in any
given position. What is stressed is that their studies and researches must
be considered and that their views must be heard before any serious attempt
on a major criminal code project is undertaken. The lawmaker has traveled
long and far on the path of presuppositions and his mistakes have been
21. See ASCHAFFENBuRG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 243; GLUECK, op. cit.

at 2o4.

Mipra note

2o,
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written into the criminal law of every state. Whatever our views and, indeed, whatever our prejudices may be, we must not ignore the evidence
presented to us by trained and competent fellow-workers.
SCOPE OF THE CODE

The workers on a code will need to determine its scope. Obviously
they cannot go into the minutim of the criminal law. Indeed, it would be
unfortunate if they did. They will need to determine what anti-social acts
are to be included and to classify and define them, but other than that iti
would be well if they adopted a plan confining the code to statementg of
broad underlying principles and aims and to the establishment of an administrative scheme which would outline basic procedures. The definitions should
be so conceived that they include sufficient elasticity to be adaptable to the
ever-changing social and economic scene and to the advances in science.
Of course it is impossible to foretell the future, but it is possible, in the
drafting of a code, to contemplate future changes. It is true that the code
will be subject to legislative changes and amendments, but it is also well
known that such changes come painfully and only interstitially. The
McNaghton test 22 was written into our law in 1843.
To be effective a code should have a unity of aim in all of its phases,
and to this end it is essential that it cover administrative features as well as
substantive law. If the criminal is to be dealt with on the basis of his dangerousness to society, the question involves not only the adequate segregation
or other means of effective disposal of the dangerous criminal, but, equally
important, the problem of salvaging the offender who is amenable to treatment. A code should, therefore, include provisions for correctional treatment in conformity with the general aims of the instrument. In fact, to
the end that the various actors in criminal law administration function toward a common objective, a code should cover all the "agencies created for
its interpretation and administration, including police, prosecutors, courts
and penal institutions." 23
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

A study as is here proposed should delve deeply into the question of
the personnel of the agencies set up by society for crime control. Some
fine pioneering has been done in this field, particularly in the reports of the
Committee on Improvement of Personnel in Criminal Law Enforcement of
the Section on Criminal Law of the American Bar Association. It probably is
true, as that Committee has stated in its last report, "that the ineffectiveness
of criminal law is attributable more to the character and attitude of the per=. McNaghton's Case, ioClark & F. 2oo (1843).
23. 12 PRoc. Am. LAW INST. (1935) 384.
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sonnel upon whom its administration depends than to deficiencies or faults
in the content of the criminal law itself." 24 But how is better administration through improvement of personnel to be achieved? The question calls
for research into the functioning of democracy as a whole and into localized
democracy; into the local administrative units of the state and especially the
25
administrative set-up of the county, the basic unit for crime control.

It

calls for an examination into the surroundings and atmosphere in which the
criminal law is administered and into the training, tenure and independence
of law-enforcing officers. The workers on a code should study the question
of whether a reallocation of functions within a state is feasible, under which
the sheriff's office and that of the prosecuting attorney might be brought
into a coordinated and unified system; and they should investigate the
practicability of a coordinated program for crime control between the state
and the federal government.
DIAGNOSTIC BOARD

The various items considered for inclusion in a major project of this
kind will need to be scrutinized in the light of existing law and particularly
in the light of constitutional provisions. One serious problem is presented
in connection with the guilt-finding factor. "Among students of criminology," says Cardozo, "there are now many who maintain that the whole
business of sentencing criminals should be taken away from the judges
and given over to the doctors." 20 But this raises the question, are 'the
judges and juries, in finding guilt, to be governed by the doctrine of criminal
responsibility and by all of its implications? It would be preferable from
the standpoint of a scientific program to have these legal agencies decide
only whether the offender has committed the anti-social act, and, once having
established that he has done that act, forthwith turn him over to a diagnostic
board set up for the purpose of determining what further is to be done
with him. This would dispose of the defense of insanity and other mental
incompetency defenses. This result obviously is a desirable objective, for
these defenses impede the program of protecting society. The insane criminal manifestly is a major menace to society. It would also render superfluous the orthodox legal tests on insanity and would make the division
of crimes into degrees unnecessary. But the question arises whether this
procedure would be constitutional under the due process clause and the
decisions of courts bearing on the traditional methods of determining
27

guilt.

2 4 . SECTION ON CRIMINAL LAW OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROGRAM AND COMMiTTFE REPORTS (1936) 25.
25. See MILLSPAUGH, LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND CRIME CONTROL (1936).
26. CARDOZO, op. cit. mipra note 1, at 79.
27. See State v. Strasburg, 6o Wash. io6, 11o Pac. 1020 (1g1o). And see comments on

this case in Rood, Statutory Abolition of the Defense of Insanity in Criminal Cases (191o) 9
MICE. L. REV. 126.
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The code should provide for indeterminate sentences, and, whether or
not the orthodox burdens involved in finding guilt are retained, the offender
should, after his guilt is determined, be turned over to a diagnostic board.
This board should be provided with a staff of competent research assistants.
It should have the responsibility of studying each individual offender to
determine his motivations and his attitude toward society, to prescribe treatment, and to decide when, if ever, he is to be released. It is essential to this
program to establish a thoroughgoing indeterminate sentence law. It may
be deemed necessary, in view of popular sentiment and attitudes, to retain
provisions for minimum sentences, graded on the gravity of the offense,
but if the aim of protecting society is to receive adequate consideration, the
maximum limits of sentences should be removed. The diagnostic board
should not, however, be given absolute and final power to determine the
maximum limits of sentences. In the interest of the individuals confined, its
decisions should be made subject to judicial review. 28
Particular attention should be given to the personnel of the diagnostic
board. It is desirable, so far as possible, to avoid specific provisions in a
code, to the end that it may have a fair measure of elasticity and be adaptable to changing conditions. But it should be specific in providing that
the diagnostic board be manned by persons who are scientifically trained and
qualified for this important and technical work. Sheldon Glueck has submitted as a broad, guiding principle, that
"Society should utilize every scientific instrumentality for self-protection against destructive elements in its midst, with as little interference
with the free life of its members as is consistent with such, social selfprotection." 29
All phases of a code should be examined in the light of this principle, and
particular weight should be given it in the establishment of a diagnostic
board, in the naming of its personnel, and in the defining of its procedures.
DEFINITIONS IN

TERMS OF THE SOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Law making, properly conceived, presents a delicate and complicated
task. By no means is it a mere problem in draftsmanship. Two divisions of

the task must be distinguished: first, the treatment phase, which has been discussed in connection with personality analysis and individualization of treatment; second, the definition phase, which involves defining anti-social behavior in terms of the solution of social problems3 0 As to the latter phase,
the work of the draftsman should be preceded by searching investigations
28. See Gausewitz, supra note 7, at 491.
29. Glueck, supra note 4, at 455.
3o. See Hall, supra note 8, at 2.
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into the underlying causes for the social situations which appear to call for
relief and then be followed by further studies to determine whether the
definitions proposed are designed to meet the situation. In the substantive
part of the code it is essential to define anti-social behavior; we must define
crimes. But on what are these definitions to be based? Surely on social
data, and this involves determining what the social problem is and how to
go about giving it relief. As Hall has pointed out in an illuminating work,
"the heart of the problem of theft is found in the receiver." 31 Has the
aim of the criminal law been focused on him? We have an elaborate and
technical array of statements defining the fine points of larceny and another
array of statements on receiving stolen goods, but the arch culprit-the
professional receiver-manages to escape their meshes. The definitions
have not searched out and defined the social problem and they have not been
designed to solve it.
This is an essential phase in the construction of a code and one which
calls for painstaking research. It places "the emphasis where it needs to be
placed, namely, upon the most detailed empirical research possible by the
most creative minds that can be enlisted." 32 Similar researches should be
made on the administrative parts of the code. Once anti-social conduct is
defined, administrative agencies must be established to check that conduct.
This involves the finding of appropriate means to accomplish the ends sought
and, equally important, the establishment of adequate restraints upon officials
to protect the individual against unfounded accusations and arbitrary action.
PREVENTION

One question keeps recurring as one seeks to view in perspective the
problem of a criminal code project. The processes of the criminal law ever
work after the fact. They are set in motion to bag the offender after he
has committed a crime. It is as if we were engaged in a hunting enterprise
under the rules of which society must not capture nor shoot until the game
has reached a given stage of growth and development. This method of
dealing with the criminal misses the essential point. Society wants protection. What are the inhibitions on the state which keep it from entering upon
a thoroughgoing program of crime prevention.3 3 Is it necessary that a
criminal code be conceived to deal only with anti-social behavior and only
through indirect means? The state does not hesitate to enact laws aimed
to prevent unwholesome conditions in matters of sanitation and health.
31. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIErY (1935) 125.
32. Hall, supra note 8, at 9.
33. "In effect, what there is in the way of preventive justice, in the domain of the criminal law, is achieved not by legal but by extra-legal agencies. It is done for the most part
not by the agencies of the law, but by social workers." POUND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 35.
See also SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (1934) 578-595; Hall, supra note 8, at
14, 15.
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Through the studies of social workers we know that there are delinquency
areas, and we know a good deal about the conditions which foster crime and
about the causes of it. Here are channels which are unexplored by the lawmakers.
In this, as on other occasions, we appear to have been lured off the trail
onto bypaths of free will and criminal responsibility. The need for crime
prevention is at the heart of the protection program. If we accept the view
that individuals are amenable to guidance and correctional treatment after
they have committed anti-social acts, all the more, it would seem clear, would
they be amenable to these influences before they have committed them. This
presents a major research factor both in its implications as a means to an
end and as a question in lawmaking. It is a problem which should engage
the serious thought and research of any group charged with the responsibility of drafting a criminal code.

